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Abstract
The vulnerability of automated fingerprint recognition
systems to presentation attacks (PA), i.e., spoof or altered
fingers, has been a growing concern, warranting the de-
velopment of accurate and efficient presentation attack de-
tection (PAD) methods. However, one major limitation of
the existing PAD solutions is their poor generalization to
new PA materials and fingerprint sensors, not used in train-
ing. In this study, we propose a robust PAD solution with
improved cross-material and cross-sensor generalization.
Specifically, we build on top of any CNN-based architec-
ture trained for fingerprint spoof detection combined with
cross-material spoof generalization using a style transfer
network wrapper. We also incorporate adversarial repre-
sentation learning (ARL) in deep neural networks (DNN)
to learn sensor and material invariant representations for
PAD. Experimental results on LivDet 2015 and 2017 pub-
lic domain datasets exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed
approach.
1. Introduction
Fingerprints are considered one of the most reliable bio-
metric traits due to their inherent uniqueness and persis-
tence, which has led to their widespread adoption in se-
cure authentication systems [27]. However, it has been
demonstrated that these systems are vulnerable to presen-
tation attacks by adversaries trying to gain access to the
system [14, 37]. A presentation attack (PA) as defined by
the ISO standard IEC 30107-1:2016(E) [24] is a “presenta-
tion to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal
of interfering with the operation of the biometric system.”
These attacks often involve a fingerprint cast from a mold
using common household materials (gelatin, silicone, wood
glue, etc) and aim to mimic the ridge-valley structure of an
enrolled user’s fingerprint [33, 3, 11, 48, 28].
The vulnerability of these systems to presentation attacks
Figure 1: Illustration of the differences in textural appearance of live fin-
gerprints captured on six different fingerprint readers. Images from LivDet
2015 [34], LivDet 2017 [35], and MSU-FPAD datasets [4].
led to a series of standard assessments of fingerprint presen-
tation attack detection (PAD) methods developed by differ-
ent organizations1. The First International Fingerprint Live-
ness Detection Competition debuted in 2009 [31] with sub-
sequent competitions every two years, the most recent being
2019 [47, 19, 34, 35, 38].
There are numerous published approaches to liveness
detection, which can be classified as hardware-based,
software-based or a combination of both. Hardware based
methods use a number of additional sensors to gain further
insight into the liveness of the presented fingerprint [1, 25,
12]. Similarly, a few sensing technologies are inherently
1In the literature, presentation attack detection (PAD) is also commonly
referred to as spoof detection and liveness detection. In this work, we use
these terms interchangeably.
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Table 1: Summary of Published Fingerprint Cross-Material Generalization Studies.
Study Approach Database Performance
Rattani et al. [40] Weibull-calibrated SVM LivDet 2011 EER = 19.70 %
Ding & Ross [9] Ensemble of multiple one-class SVMs LivDet 2011 EER = 17.06 %
Chugh & Jain [4] MobileNet-v1 trained on
minutiae-centered local patches
LivDet 2011-2015 ACE = 1.48 % (LivDet 2015),
2.93 % (LivDet 2011, 2013)
Chugh & Jain [5] Identify a representative set of spoof
materials to cover the deep feature space
MSU-FPAD v2.0,
12 spoof materials
TDR = 75.24 % @ FDR = 0.2 %
Engelsma & Jain [13] Ensemble of generative adversarial
networks (GANs)
Custom database
with live and 12
spoof materials
TDR = 49.80 % @ FDR = 0.2 %
Gonzalez-Soler et
al. [20]
Feature encoding of dense-SIFT features LivDet 2011-2015 TDR = 7.03 % @ FDR = 1.0 %
(LivDet 2015), ACE = 1.01 %
(LivDet 2011, 2013)
Tolosana et al. [43] Fusion of two CNN architectures trained
on SWIR images
Custom database
with live and 8
spoof materials
EER = 1.35 %
Gajawada et al. [15] Style transfer from spoof to live images
with a few samples of target material
LivDet 2015,
CrossMatch sensor
TDR = 78.04 % @ FDR = 0.1 %
Chugh & Jain [6] Style transfer between known spoof
materials to improve generalizability
against unknown materials
MSU-FPAD v2.0,
12 spoof materials
& LivDet 2017
TDR = 91.78 % @ FDR = 0.2 %
(MSU-FPAD v2.0); Avg. Accuracy =
95.88 % (LivDet 2017)
Proposed Approach Style transfer with a few samples of target
sensor fingerprint images + ARL
LivDet 2015 TDR = 87.86 % @ FDR = 0.2 %
cross-sensor & cross-material
well suited for liveness detection and have been used for fin-
gerprint PAD, such as the multispectral Lumidigm sensor or
OCT based senors [7]. On the other hand, software-based
solutions use only the information contained in the captured
fingerprint image (or a sequence of images) to classify a fin-
gerprint as bonafide or PA [32, 30, 18, 17, 36, 39, 4]. Of the
existing software solutions, convolutional neural network
(CNN) approaches have shown the best performance on the
respective genuine vs. PA benchmark datasets. However, it
has been shown that the spoof detection error rates of these
approaches suffer up to a three fold increase when applied
to datasets containing spoof materials not seen during train-
ing, denoted as cross-material generalization [29, 42].
Some published studies aimed at reducing the perfor-
mance gap due to cross material evaluations are summa-
rized in Table 1. A similar performance gap exists for
cross-sensor generalization, in which presentation attack
algorithms are applied to fingerprint images captured on
new fingerprint sensor devices that were not seen during
training. One explanation for the challenge of cross-sensor
generalization is the different textural characteristics in the
fingerprint images from different sensors (Figure 1). This
discrepancy in the representation performance between the
seen source domain and the unseen target domain has been
referred to as the “domain gap” in the growing literature
of deep neural network models applied for representational
learning [2]. The cross-sensor evaluation can be considered
as two separate cases: (i) all sensors in the evaluation em-
ploy the same sensing technology, e.g., all optical FTIR, and
(ii) the sensors may vary in the underlying sensing mecha-
nisms used, e.g., optical direct-view vs. capacitive.
In this work, we aim to improve the fingerprint pre-
sentation attack detection generalization across novel spoof
materials and fingerprint sensing devices2. Our approach
builds off any existing CNN-based architecture trained for
fingerprint liveliness detection combined with cross ma-
terial spoof generalization using a style transfer network
wrapper. We also incorporate adversarial representation
learning (ARL) in deep neural networks (DNN) to learn
sensor and material invariant representations for presenta-
tion attack detection.
The main contributions of this study are enumerated be-
low:
1. A robust PAD solution with improved cross-material
and cross-sensor generalization performance.
2. Our solution can be built on top of any CNN-based
fingerprint PAD solution for cross-sensor and cross-
2Generally, fingerprint sensor refers to the fingerprint sensing mecha-
nism (e.g., camera and prism for FTIR optical, direct-view camera, thermal
measurement device, etc.) and fingerprint reader refers to the entire pro-
cess of converting a physical fingerprint into a digital image. In this work,
similar to the literature, we use these two terms interchangeably.
Figure 2: Overview of the network architecture for the proposed UMG + ARL approach for live vs. presentation attack (PA) detection. SA, SB , SC , and SD
represent fingerprint images from four different fingerprint sensors. LT denotes a cross-entropy loss on the target prediction, LA denotes a cross-entropy
loss on the sensor label prediction, and LE denotes the loss propagated to the encoder.
material spoof generalization using adversarial repre-
sentational learning.
3. Experimental evaluation of the proposed approach on
publicly available datasets LivDet 2015, LivDet 2017,
and MSU-FPAD. Our approach is shown to improve
the cross-sensor (cross-material) generalization perfor-
mance from a TDR of 88.36% (78.76%) to a TDR of
92.94% (87.86%) at a FDR of 0.2%.
4. Feature space analysis of cross-sensor domain separa-
tion of the embedded representations prior to and fol-
lowing adversarial representation learning.
5. Detailed discussion of the challenges and techniques
involved in applying deep-adversarial representation
learning for spoof detection.
2. Related Work
In this section we briefly discuss the preliminaries of do-
main adaptation and domain generalization in the context of
machine learning. Csurka provides a more in-depth review
of domain adaptation [8]. Similarly, Wang and Deng pro-
vide a specific survey of the recent deep domain adaptation
methods [45]. We also describe adversarial representation
learning (ARL) as it is applied to the tasks of domain adap-
tation and domain generalization.
2.1. Domain Adaptation and Domain Generaliza-
tion
A domain refers to a probability distribution over which
data examples are drawn from. In this context, domain
adaptation and domain generalization are approaches to ma-
chine learning aimed at minimizing the performance gap
between training data examples from a seen “source” do-
main and testing data from a related, but different “target”
domain. Therefore, domain adaptation and domain gener-
alization are applied to situations in which the training and
testing data points are not both independently and identi-
cally sampled from the same distribution. While domain
adaptation involves training on labeled examples from the
source domain and unlabeled data from the target domain,
domain generalization assumes no access to labeled or un-
labeled data examples from the target domain.
2.2. Adversarial Representation Learning (ARL)
Adversarial representation learning is a machine learn-
ing technique that can be applied to both domain adap-
tation and domain generalization. Adversarial representa-
tion learning has been applied in DNN architectures to ex-
tract discriminative representations for a given target pre-
diction task (say face recognition), while obfuscating some
undesired attributes present in the data (say gender informa-
tion) [10, 16, 44, 49].
The general setup of ARL involves (i) an encoder net-
work, (ii) a target prediction network, and (iii) an adversary
network. The encoder network aims to extract a latent rep-
resentation (z) that is not only informative for the target pre-
diction task (t), but also does not leak any information for
the sensitive task (s). Meanwhile, the adversary network
is tasked with extracting the sensitive information from the
encoded latent representation. The entire network is trained
in a minimax game similar to the generative adversarial net-
works introduced by Goodfellow et al. [21].
In Xie et al., the parameters of the adversary network are
optimized to maximize the likelihood of the sensitive label
prediction, whereas the encoder is trained to maximize the
likelihood of the target task, while minimizing the likeli-
hood of the sensitive task [46]. In contrast, our proposed
work is more aligned with the approach proposed by Roy
and Bodetti [41], where the adversary network is optimized
to maximize the likelihood of the sensitive label prediction
from the latent representation and the encoder is trained to
maximize the entropy of the sensitive label prediction. In
this manner, the base network is encouraged to encode a
representation that aims to confuse the sensitive label pre-
diction such that the adversary predicts equal probabilities
(maximum entropy) for all classes of the sensitive label.
3. Proposed Approach
Our proposed approach is multifaceted and combines
ideas from style transfer, which was previously applied for
spoof detection, and adversarial representation learning to
improve the generalization performance of PAD across dif-
ferent fingerprint sensing devices. An overview of the ap-
proach which highlights each of the individual components
is shown in Figure 2. Here we introduce each individual
component and later discuss the generalization performance
improvement achieved with the incorporation of each tech-
nique leading up to the final approach.
3.1. Base CNN
What we refer to as the base CNN approach is a convo-
lutional neural network (CNN) trained on 96 x 96 aligned
minutiae-centered patches for classifying a given fingerprint
impression as live or spoof. As was shown by Chugh and
Jain [4], utilizing minutiae patches, as opposed to whole
images, overcomes the difficulty in processing fingerprint
images of different sizes, provides large amounts of train-
ing examples suitable to training deep CNN architectures,
and encourages the network to learn local textural cues to
robustly separate bonafide from fake fingerprints. This base
CNN approach is illustrated in Figure 2 as the box enclosed
by the green line.
The specific architecture of the CNN model employed is
the MobileNet-v1 model [23] (the same as in [4])3, where
the final 1000-unit softmax layer is replaced with a 2-unit
softmax layer suitable for the two-class problem of live vs.
3Any other CNN-based approach other than [4] can be used instead.
spoof. The network is trained from scratch with an RM-
SProp optimizer at a batch size of 64. During training, data
augmentation tools of random distorted cropping, horizon-
tal flipping and random brightness were employed to en-
courage robustness to overfitting to minute variations of the
input images.
3.2. Adversarial Representational Learning (ARL)
ARL is an approach to domain generalization that does
not require any knowledge of the unseen target domain, yet
aims to learn a generalized and robust feature representa-
tion for both source and target domains. The goal of the
ARL approach is to encourage an encoding network to learn
a representation that is invariant to which sensor generated
the input fingerprint images (sensitive label), while accu-
rately predicting live vs. PA (target label).
In this setup, the encoder network is represented as a
deterministic function, z = E(x; θE), the target predic-
tion network estimates the conditional distribution p(t|x)
through qT (t|z; θT), and the adversary network estimates
the conditional distribution p(s|x) through qA(s|z; θA);
where x denotes the input fingerprint image, p(t|x) and
p(s|x) represent the probabilities of ground truth target and
sensitive labels t and s, respectively.
To learn this sensor-invariant representation, the adver-
sary network is trained to maximize the likelihood of pre-
dicting which sensor generated the input fingerprint image
from the encoded representation. The parameters, θA, of
the adversary network are updated to minimize the loss de-
fined in equation 1. The output of the adversary network
is used to encourage the encoder to produce a representa-
tion that obfuscates the sensitive class labels by penalizing
the parameters of the encoder, θE, to minimize the loss in
equation 2, where α is a hyper-parameter that allows for a
trade-off between obfuscation of the sensitive label and pre-
diction of the target label. Meanwhile, to accurately predict
live vs. PA, the parameters of target prediction network, θT,
are optimized to minimize the loss in equation 3. The ARL
approach is shown in Figure 2 by the box enclosed by the
red line.
LA = Ex,s[− log qA(s|E(x; θE); θA)] (1)
LE = Ex,t[− log qT (t|E(x; θE); θT)]
+ αEx[
m∑
i=1
qA(si|E(x; θE); θA) log qA(si|E(x; θE); θA)]
(2)
LT = Ex,t[− log qT (t|E(x; θE); θT)] (3)
3.3. Naı¨ve
A simple approach to cross-sensor generalization is one in
which we assume access to a limited number of training exam-
ples (100 live and PA fingerprint images) from the target sensor
that we include during training, which doesn’t require collecting
extensive amounts of data from the target domain. This is a reason-
able assumption in the case of cross-sensor generalization, where
we have access to the sensing device on which the system will be
deployed. This is in contrast to generalization to unknown spoof
materials, where we cannot assume any prior knowledge of the
unknown target materials. We denote this method as the naı¨ve ap-
proach to cross-sensor spoof detection as it does not require any
changes to the system architecture.
3.4. Naı¨ve + ARL
We combine the naı¨ve approach with ARL to take advantage of
the benefits of each separate approach. By exposing the network to
the textural characteristics inherent to the small number of target
sensor images during training, the goal is that the network will bet-
ter learn a mapping from images to representations for each sensor
domain. Furthermore, by incorporating the adversary during train-
ing to learn a sensor-invariant representation, we aim to overcome
the apparent imbalance in the number of training examples from
source and target sensors.
3.5. Universal Material Generator (UMG)
The final technique that we incorporate is a style transfer ap-
proach, coupled on top of the naı¨ve approach, to augment the
training data from the target sensor. The specific style transfer
network we use is the Universal Material Generator (UMG) pro-
posed in [6] that inputs source and target domain minutiae patches
and produces a large amount of synthetic training images in the
target sensor domain. UMG achieves this by learning a mapping
from the style of the source domain image patches to the style of
the target domain image patches. Concretely, the UMG separates
the content information, i.e, the fingerprint ridge structure, and
the style, i.e, textural information, of a given fingerprint minutiae
patch and produces a synthetic image that has the content of the
source domain and the style of the target domain. An overview of
the UMG approach is shown as the box enclosed by the blue line
in Figure 2.
3.6. UMG + ARL (Proposed Approach)
The proposed approach applies ARL with the UMG style trans-
fer wrapper to further improve generalization performance. An il-
lustration of the ARL + UMG approach is illustrated in Figure 2
as everything enclosed by the box formed by the solid, black line.
Like the naı¨ve approach, this method inherently assumes knowl-
edge of a limited set of examples from the target domain sensor.
Specifically, we assume 100 live and 100 PA images from the tar-
get sensor. From this small set of images from the target sensor, we
produce a much larger set of synthetic images in the target domain
using the UMG wrapper to transfer the style of the target domain
to the content of the source domain training images.
The advantage of this approach is that we leverage the ability
of the UMG wrapper to ensure a balanced dataset from all sensors
(source and target), which we combine with ARL that forces the
network to learn a sensor-invariant representation. In the following
section, we demonstrate the performance gains over the previous
approaches and show that the UMG coupled with ARL achieves
the new state-of-the-art in cross-sensor and cross-material gener-
alization of fingerprint PAD.
4. Evaluation Procedure
In this section we describe the experimental protocol of the
various experiments carried out in this study, the datasets involved
in each experiment, and the implementation details of the UMG +
ARL approach.
4.1. Experimental Protocol
To evaluate cross-sensor PAD performance, we adopt the
leave-one-out protocol where one sensor is set aside for testing
and the network is trained on data from all remaining sensors.
To analyze separately the cross-sensor performance and the cross-
material performance, we segment our evaluation to include the
case where all materials during testing were included during train-
ing (cross-sensor only) and the case where no materials during
training were seen in testing (cross-sensor and cross-material).
4.2. Datasets
The data used in the experiments for this paper are from the
LivDet 2015, LivDet 2017, and MSU-FPAD datasets, which are
summarized in Tables 2 and 3. The LivDet 2015 dataset consists of
four sensors: Biometrika, CrossMatch, Digital Persona, and Green
Bit. These sensors are all FTIR optical image capturing devices.
We utilize this dataset to evaluate the generalization performance
across different fingerprint readers with the same sensing technol-
ogy. To further evaluate our approach on fingerprint readers with
different sensing mechanisms, we experiment on fingerprint data
from the Lumidigm sensor of the MSU-FPAD dataset. This sen-
sor uses different sensing technology from the four seen in the
LivDet 2015 as it is a multi-spectral, direct-view capture device.
Finally, we incorporate a third dataset, LivDet 2017, which con-
sists of three sensors: Digital Persona, Green Bit, and Orcanthus,
where Orcanthus uses thermal-based imaging.
4.3. Implementation Details
The architecture of the encoder in the proposed approach is
MobileNet-v1 with the final 1000-unit softmax layer removed,
which is used to encode a latent representation z ∈ Rd. In our
implementation, d = 1024. The target predictor is a single fully
connected layer of 2-dimensions (for predicting live vs. PA) with a
softmax activation. The adversary network consists of a fully con-
nected layer with a softmax activation of output dimension equal
to the number of source sensors in the training dataset, e.g., 3 in
the leave-one-out protocol on the LivDet 2015 dataset.
Training adversarial losses is notoriously difficult and often
requires extensive hyper-parameter tuning. For example, it was
found advantageous during training to update the parameters, θA,
of the adversary network five times per every update of the en-
coder and target predictor. We also explored adjusting the number
of hidden layers in the adversary network, but no significant im-
provements over a single layer network were observed. A grid
Table 2: Summary of the 2015 and 2017 Liveness Detection (LivDet) Datasets.
Dataset LivDet 2015 LivDet 2017
Fingerprint Reader Green Bit Biometrika Digital Persona CrossMatch Green Bit Orcanthus Digital Persona
Model DactyScan26 HiScan-PRO U.are.U 5160 L Scan Guardian Dacty Scan 84C Cerits2 Image U.are.U 5160
Image Size 500 x 500 1000 x 1000 252 x 324 640 x 480 500 x 500 300 x n† 252 x 324
Resolution (dpi) 500 1000 500 500 569 500 500
#Live Images
Train / Test
1000 / 1000 1000 / 1000 1000 / 1000 1510 / 1500 1000 / 1700 1000 / 1700 1000 / 1692
#Spoof Images
Train / Test
1000 / 1500 1000 /1500 1000 / 1500 1473 / 1448 1200 / 2040 1180∗/ 2018 1199 / 2028
Spoof Materials Ecoflex, Gelatine, Latex, Wood Glue, Liquid Ecoflex,
RTV
Body Double,
Ecoflex, Play-
Doh, OOMOO,
Gelatin
Wood Glue, Ecoflex, Body Double, Gelatine, Latex,
Liquid Ecoflex
† Fingerprint images captured by Orcanthus have a variable height (350 - 450 pixels) depending on the friction ridge content.
∗ A Set of 20 Latex spoof fingerprints were present in the training data of Orcanthus; which were excluded in our experiments because only Wood Glue, Ecoflex, and
Body Double are expected to be in the training dataset.
Table 3: Summary of the MSU-FPAD Dataset.
Dataset MSU-FPAD
Fingerprint Reader CrossMatch Lumidigm
Model Guardian 200 Venus 302
Image Size 750 x 800 400 x 272
Resolution (dpi) 500 500
#Live Images
Train / Test
2250 / 2250 2250 / 2250
#Spoof Images
Train / Test
3000 / 3000 2250 / 2250
Spoof Materials Ecoflex, PlayDoh, 2D Print (Matte
Paper), 2D Print (Transparency)
search was performed over the value of α for selecting the influ-
ence of the adversary on updating the parameters, θE, of the en-
coder, and the optimal parameter value of α = 0.1 was selected
(See Eq. 2).
5. Experimental Results
Here we present the results of each experiment to evaluate the
cross-sensor and cross-material generalization performance of the
proposed approach. This section is divided into several parts to fa-
cilitate an in-depth analysis of the generalization performance of
the algorithm to each of the following cases: cross-sensor, cross-
material, and cross-sensing technology. A discussion on the ef-
fect of varying the number of assumed target domain images is
included in section 5.4. We conclude this section with an analy-
sis of the deep feature space prior to and following the application
of the proposed methodology for fingerprint spoof generalization.
The feature space analysis is conducted utilizing a 2-dimensional
t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) visualiza-
tion [26].
There has not been much prior work aimed specifically at im-
proving cross-sensor generalization of fingerprint PAD; nonethe-
less, there are a few cross-sensor performance results reported in
the literature. Chugh and Jain report the cross-sensor performance
of Fingerprint Spoof Buster, which shares the same architecture of
our base encoder model [4]. Therefore, in the following sections
we compare our performance against that of Fingerprint Spoof
Buster as the Base CNN model. Furthermore, Chugh and Jain
report cross-sensor results in their work toward improving cross-
material generalization with the introduction of their UMG net-
work wrapper [6]. For comparison with this approach, we refer to
their work as the UMG approach in Tables 4 and 5 of this section.
5.1. Cross-Sensor Performance
To evaluate cross-sensor generalization we utilize the LivDet
2015 dataset which consists of four different FTIR optical finger-
print imaging devices and we apply a leave-one-out strategy where
the algorithm is trained on only three of the four sensors at a time.
We then compare the performance on a test set of data from these
three sensors included in the training to the performance on a test
set consisting of data from the remaining sensor. We repeat this
procedure for all four combinations of sensors and report the re-
sults in Table 4.
To separate out the cross-sensor generalization performance
from the related task of cross-material generalization, we first re-
move all the non-overlapping materials between the testing dataset
of the target sensor and the training datasets of the three source
sensors. For this experiment, Liquid Ecoflex and RTV materials
were excluded from the testing sets when Green Bit, Biometrika,
and Digital Persona were the target sensors; whereas, Body Dou-
ble, Playdoh, and OOMOO were excluded from the testing set
with CrossMatch as the target sensor.
As shown in Table 4, the proposed approach of UMG +
ARL increases the average cross-sensor generalization in terms
of True Detection Rate (TDR) at a False Detection Rate (FDR)
of 0.2%4 from 88.36% to 92.94% over the UMG only method.
The proposed approach also maintains higher performance (TDR
= 90.13%) on the source domain sensors compared to the UMG
only approach (TDR = 86.98%). Lastly, we note that the stan-
dard deviation (s.d.) across the four experiments of cross-sensor
generalization on the LivDet 2015 dataset is significantly reduced
for the UMG + ARL method (11.27% to 4.09%), in comparison
UMG only, indicating the robustness of the proposed approach.
For completeness, we include an evaluation of using an addi-
tional CNN architecture, Resnet-v1-505 [22], as the base encoder
4We consider this metric to be more representative of actual use cases
as opposed to EER and ACE. Space limitation does not allow us to show
the full ROC curve.
5Resnet-v1-50 was chosen since the authors of other SOTA fingerprint
PAD algorithms were not willing to share their code and we found the
Table 4: Cross-Sensor Generalization Performance (TDR (%) @ FDR = 0.2 %)† with Leave-One-Out Method on LivDet 2015 Dataset with Materials
Common to Training and Testing, i.e., Excluding Cross-Materials‡. Bio = Biometrika, CM = CrossMatch, DP = Digital Persona, and GB = GreenBit.
Source∗
CM, DP, GB
Target?
Bio
Source
Bio, DP, GB
Target
CM
Source
Bio, CM, GB
Target
DP
Source
Bio, CM, DP
Target
GB
Source
Mean± s.d.
Target
Mean± s.d.
Base CNN [4] 90.34 75.16 88.20 3.33 98.40 10.76 92.82 70.74 92.44± 4.40 40.00± 38.21
ARL 93.44 80.51 91.03 2.11 98.73 11.74 92.04 64.74 93.81± 3.43 39.78± 38.67
Naı¨ve 87.74 84.80 88.23 97.37 96.96 59.13 88.08 90.68 90.25± 4.48 83.00± 16.72
UMG [6] 89.10 94.33 84.28 90.70 96.39 71.85 78.14 96.57 86.98± 7.71 88.36± 11.27
Naı¨ve + ARL 90.18 91.86 87.87 98.95 94.21 52.07 89.15 83.92 90.35± 2.74 81.70± 20.69
UMG + ARL 88.98 92.83 88.48 97.54 96.18 87.61 86.88 93.78 90.13± 4.13 92.94± 4.09
†We use FDR = 0.2 % because this is the stringent metric being used by the IARPA Odin program. Due to space limits, it is challenging to show the complete Receiver
Operating Curve (ROC) or Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curve.
‡ Liquid Ecoflex and RTV materials were excluded from the testing sets of Green Bit, Biometrika, and Digital Persona. Body Double, Playdoh, and OOMOO were excluded
from the testing set of CrossMatch.
∗ Sensors included in the training set (source)
? Sensors included in the test set (target)
Table 5: Cross-Sensor and Cross-Material Generalization Performance (TDR (%) @ FDR = 0.2 %) with Leave-One-Out Method on LivDet 2015 Dataset
with Materials Exclusive to the Testing Datasets, i.e., Cross-Material Only. Bio = Biometrika, CM = CrossMatch, DP = Digital Persona, and GB = GreenBit.
Source
CM, DP, GB
Target
Bio
Source
Bio, DP, GB
Target
CM
Source
Bio, CM, GB
Target
DP
Source
Bio, CM, DP
Target
GB
Source
Mean± s.d.
Target
Mean± s.d.
Base CNN [4] 90.34 63.92 88.20 4.46 98.40 11.39 92.82 72.39 92.44± 4.40 38.04± 35.06
ARL 92.78 72.58 91.03 6.06 98.73 13.08 92.04 49.69 93.65± 3.47 35.35± 31.33
Naı¨ve 87.74 77.11 88.23 96.80 96.96 42.62 88.08 85.69 90.25± 4.48 75.56± 23.39
UMG [6] 89.10 87.01 84.28 81.37 96.39 54.43 78.14 92.23 86.98± 7.71 78.76± 16.82
Naı¨ve + ARL 90.18 86.19 87.87 97.45 94.21 35.65 82.51 65.44 88.69± 4.88 71.18± 27.15
UMG + ARL 89.31 89.07 88.48 92.69 96.18 78.69 86.88 91.00 90.21± 4.10 87.86± 6.29
Table 6: Cross-Sensor Generalization Performance (TDR (%) @ FDR =
0.2 %) on Leave-Out Biometrika (LivDet 2015) using Resnet-v1-50 as the
Base CNN Model. Bio = Biometrika, CM = CrossMatch, DP = Digital
Persona, and GB = GreenBit.
Source
CM, DP, GB
Target
Bio
Base CNN [22] 65.29 76.02
ARL 72.72 72.27
Naı¨ve 73.55 90.79
UMG [6] 72.76 91.76
Naı¨ve + ARL 73.05 92.18
UMG + ARL 75.94 92.83
to demonstrate the generality of the proposed approach. In Ta-
ble 6, we report the performance with ResNet-v1-50 as the Base
CNN model on LivDet 2015 with leaving Biometrika out as the
target sensor. We see that the performance improvement is con-
sistent for both Base CNN models, supporting the generality of
the approach to any existing CNN architecture trained for finger-
print spoof detection. In the remaining experiments, we continue
to report results for only Spoof Buster as the Base CNN model.
5.2. Cross-Sensor and Cross-Material Performance
We now compare the performance of each solution on the
cross-sensor and cross-material experiment by following the same
procedure as the cross-sensor experiment, while including only
materials exclusive to the test datasets of LivDet 2015. Even
details of their reported implementations insufficient for reproducing for a
fair evaluation.
though our system was trained to adversarially learn a sensor-
invariant representation, we report the results of including unseen
materials to evaluate whether we automatically obtain the added
benefit of cross-material generalization (Table 5).
The results of Table 5 agree with the results of the cross-sensor
only experiment shown previously; however, we note small per-
formance declines due to the evaluation on only unknown spoof
materials. Specifically, the average TDR at a FDR of 0.2% of the
proposed approach decreased from 92.38% for cross-sensor only
to 87.86% for cross-sensor and cross-material generalization on
the target sensor. However, we notice that the performance degra-
dation of the UMG + ARL method is less than the drop in per-
formance of the UMG only approach, which further demonstrates
the generalization benefits of incorporating ARL for fingerprint
PAD. It seems that learning an invariance to the textural differ-
ences between different sensors also encourages an invariance to
the textural differences between different spoof materials.
5.3. Cross-Sensing Technology Performance
In this section, we expand our analysis to include generaliza-
tion across different fingerprint sensing mechanisms, where the
sensing technology of the source fingerprint readers during train-
ing is different from the target test reader. For the first experiment
we incorporate the data from the Lumidigm multispectral sensor of
the MSU-FPAD database as the test sensor and the four FTIR op-
tical sensors of LivDet 2015 as our training sensors. In this exper-
iment we do not control for unknown materials between training
and test sets, thus we could consider the evaluation as a combina-
tion of cross-sensor, cross-material, and cross-sensing technology.
The results show that UMG + ARL achieves the highest general-
Table 7: Cross-Sensing Technology Generalization Performance (TDR
(%) @ FDR = 0.2 %) with Four Sensors of LivDet 2015 Dataset Included
During Training and Lumidigm from the MSU-FPAD Dataset Left Out For
Testing. Bio = Biometrika, CM = CrossMatch, DP = Digital Persona, GB
= GreenBit, and Lum = Lumidigm.
Source
Bio, CM, DP, GB
Target
Lum
Base CNN [4] 90.40 0.60
ARL 87.41 3.00
Naı¨ve 63.54 61.27
UMG [6] 88.24 80.60
Naı¨ve + ARL 87.22 84.93
UMG + ARL 88.45 88.60
Table 8: Cross-Sensing Technology Generalization Performance (TDR
(%) @ FDR = 0.2 %) on LivDet 2017 Dataset.
Source
Mean± s.d.
Target
Mean± s.d.
Base CNN [4] 41.43± 5.83 4.63± 8.71
ARL 38.92± 6.64 7.35± 12.27
Naı¨ve 43.90± 7.26 27.30± 6.82
UMG [6] 39.02± 14.71 34.80± 4.96
Naı¨ve + ARL 44.63± 15.52 30.30± 11.97
UMG + ARL 38.50± 14.63 36.47± 9.86
ization TDR of 88.60% on the target domain sensor (Figure 7).
To further evaluate the generalization performance of the pro-
posed UMG + ARL approach, we repeat the experiments on a third
dataset, LivDet 2017, which consists of data from three different
sensors: Green Bit (optical FTIR), Digital Persona (optical FTIR),
and Orcanthus (thermal). With the inclusion of the Orcanthus sen-
sor as a thermal based technology, we can evaluate cross-sensing
technology performance where the underlying imaging technol-
ogy between the sensors is substantially different. Further, we do
not remove unseen material types between the training and testing
datasets of LivDet 2017 for this experiment. As shown in Table 8,
the generalization performance (TDR @ FDR = 0.2%) on LivDet
2017 improves over the state-of-the-art from 34.80% to 36.47%.
5.4. Varying Number of Target Domain Images
To study the effect of varying the number of assumed target do-
main images available during training, we repeat the experiments
in the leave-out Biometrika (LivDet 2015) scenario. Specifically,
we run experiments on 50 and 250 live and PA training images
from the target domain. As shown in Table 9, increasing the num-
ber of target domain images greatly benefits the naı¨ve approach,
but only marginally affects the UMG + ARL method. Therefore,
the benefit of UMG + ARL is most pronounced in cases with lim-
ited target domain training examples. In the trade-off between time
spent for data collection and performance, the proposed method
can significantly help reduce the burden of expensive data collec-
tion.
5.5. Feature Space Analysis
To explore the benefits of incorporating ARL on top of the
UMG only approach, we extract 2-dimensional t-SNE feature em-
beddings of the live and spoof fingerprint minutiae patches from
the final 1024-unit layer of the MobileNet-v1 encoder network,
Table 9: Cross-Sensor Generalization Performance (TDR (%) @ FDR =
0.2 %) on Leave-Out Biometrika (LivDet 2015) with Varying Number of
Target Sensor Training Images.
50 Images 250 Images
Source Target Source Target
Naı¨ve 91.21 90.15 91.04 95.29
UMG [6] 93.19 90.47 91.00 89.19
Naı¨ve + ARL 85.64 91.43 95.50 95.40
UMG + ARL 90.76 93.25 90.71 93.04
(a) (b)
Figure 3: 2-dimensional t-SNE feature embeddings of the target sensor
fingerprint minutiae patches for the (a) UMG only and (b) UMG + ARL
models trained on the LivDet 2015 dataset with Biometrika, Green Bit, and
Digital Persona as the source sensors and CrossMatch as the target sensor.
The blue and red dots represent live and spoof minutiae patches of finger-
print impressions captured on the target sensor (CrossMatch), respectively.
prior to the softmax non-linearity, from the UMG only network
and the UMG + ARL network. For brevity, we just show the re-
sults of the leave-one-out protocol on the LivDet 2015 dataset with
Biometrika, Green Bit, and Digital Persona as the source sensors
and CrossMatch as the target sensor. In Figure 3, we plot these
embeddings to analyze the effect of adversarially enforcing the
learning of a sensor-invariant representation. Figure 3 (a) shows
the separation between live and spoof fingerprint minutiae patch
embeddings of the UMG only network for minutiae patches from
the target sensor, i.e., CrossMatch, whereas (b) shows the separa-
tion of the embeddings produced by the UMG + ARL approach.
We can see that the proposed method provides noticeably better
separation between the live and fingerprint spoof patches, result-
ing in the improved PAD performance.
6. Conclusion
Diverse and sophisticated presentation attacks pose a threat to
the effectiveness of fingerprint recognition systems for reliable au-
thentication and security. Previous PAD algorithms have demon-
strated success in scenarios for which significant training data of
bonafide and spoof fingerprint images are available, but are not
robust to generalize well to novel spoof materials unseen during
training. Additionally, previous fingerprint PAD solutions are not
generalizable across different fingerprint readers, meaning that a
PAD algorithm trained on a specific fingerprint reader will not per-
form well when applied to different fingerprint sensing devices.
The proposed approach towards fingerprint PAD demonstrates
an improvement over the state-of-the-art, in terms of true detec-
tion rate (TDR) at a false detection rate (FDR) of 0.2%, on cross-
sensor and cross-material generalization. In particular, incorporat-
ing adversarial representation learning with the Universal Material
Generator (UMG) improves the cross-sensor generalization per-
formance from a TDR of 88.36 ± 11.27% to 92.94 ± 4.09% on
the LivDet 2015 dataset, while maintaining higher performance
on the sensors seen during training. Further, including cross-
materials with the cross-sensor evaluation leads to an improve-
ment of 78.76 ± 16.82% to 87.86 ± 6.29%. Lastly, experi-
ments involving cross-sensor, cross-material, and cross-sensing
technology show average improvements of 80.60% to 88.60% and
34.80% to 36.47% with the proposed approach over state-of-the-
art, on the MSU-FPAD and LivDet 2017 datasets, respectively.
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